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Abstract
We study how bank collateral assets and their pledgeability affect the amplitude of credit
cycles. To this end, we develop a tractable model where bankers intermediate funds between
savers and borrowers. If bankers default, savers acquire the right to liquidate bankers’assets.
However, due to the vertically integrated structure of our credit economy, savers anticipate
that liquidating financial assets (i.e., loans) is conditional on borrowers being solvent on their
debt obligations. This friction limits the collateralization of bankers’financial assets beyond
that of real assets (i.e., capital). In this context, increasing the pledgeability of financial
assets eases more credit and reduces the spread between the loan and the deposit rate, thus
attenuating capital misallocation as it typically emerges in credit economies à la Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). We uncover a close connection between the collateralization of bank loans,
macroeconomic amplification and the degree of procyclicality of bank leverage.
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1 Introduction
Lending relationships are typically plagued by information asymmetries that play a key role in
shaping macroeconomic outcomes. In this respect, banks are of central importance, as they are
involved in at least two layers of financial contracting, through their intermediation activity be-
tween savers and borrowers. This paper focuses on the macroeconomic implications of banks’
portfolio decisions over different assets in the presence of chained financial frictions, intended as
the combination of collateralized borrowing by both banks and entrepreneurs. To this end, we
devise a tractable model that integrates limited enforceability of loan contracts– as popularized
by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (KM, hereafter)– with an analogous friction characterizing the fi-
nancial relationship between depositors and bankers. As in recent contributions on banking and
the macroeconomy (see, inter alia, Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2015), deposits are secured by a fraction
of bankers’assets that are pledged as collateral. The main departure from these studies consists
of envisaging different degrees of liquidity– and, thus, pledgeability– for different types of bank
assets. In doing so, our key contribution consists of detailing the mechanisms through which het-
erogeneous collateral assets shape bankers’incentives to intermediate funds, and ultimately affect
the amplitude of credit cycles.
Financial institutions resort to collateralized debt to raise funds, providing assets as a guarantee
in case of default on their debt obligations. This is the case for non-traditional banking activities–
with sale and repurchase agreements (repos) employed as the main source of funding– as well as for
commercial banks, where securitized-banking often supplements more traditional intermediation
activities. In fact, banks employ financial collateral both for currency management purposes and,
more recently, as part of non-standard monetary policy frameworks.1 A vast literature has focused
on quantifying the dynamic multiplier emerging from the limited enforceability of debt contracts in
economies à la KM.2 While most of the contributions in this tradition have emphasized the role of
borrowers’collateral for the amplification of macroeconomic shocks, bank collateral has generally
been overlooked. We seek to fill this gap.
In our model the ability of bankers to intermediate funds between savers and borrowers rests on
the composition of different assets they are able to pledge as collateral. Along with extending bank
loans, bankers may also invest in an infinitely-lived productive asset, ‘capital’, whose main purpose
is to serve as a buffer against which the intermediary is trusted to be able to meet its financial
obligations. As such, capital held by bankers provides a source of insider equity, which is necessary
to overcome the agency problem in the model. In turn, deposits are bounded from above by bankers’
holdings of both types of collateral assets. However, due to the vertically integrated structure of
1The set of assets that central banks accept from commercial banks generally includes government bonds and
other debt instruments issued by the public sector and international/supranational institutions. In some cases,
also securities issued by the private sector can be accepted, such as covered bank bonds, uncovered bank bonds,
asset-backed securities or corporate bonds.
2See Kocherlakota (2000), Krishnamurthy (2003) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), inter alia.
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our credit economy savers anticipate that, in case of bankers’default, liquidating their financial
claims (i.e., bank loans) is subordinated to borrowers being solvent on their debt obligations. This
friction, which has not been formerly investigated, affects savers’perceived liquidity of bankers’
financial assets beyond that of capital,3 inducing a transaction cost depositors have to bear in
order to liquidate bank loans. If the latter are regarded as relatively illiquid, savers will be less
prone to accept them as collateral.
A key feature of the model is that combining limited enforceability of deposit and loan contracts
reduces the interest rate on loans below the one that would prevail in a standard economy where
only loans are secured by collateral assets. This allows borrowers to extend their capital holdings,
contributing to increase total production in the steady state and alleviating capital misallocation
as it emerges in economies à la KM, where borrowers hold too little capital in equilibrium, due
to constrained borrowing. This property has a key implication for equilibrium dynamics: as the
propagation of technology shifts crucially rests on the distribution of real assets between lenders
and borrowers, envisaging financially constrained intermediaries into an otherwise standard KM
economy produces a ‘banking attenuator’that is neither linked to the procyclicality of the external
finance premium (Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007), nor to monopolistic competition and interest
rate-setting rigidities in financial intermediation (Gerali et al., 2010).
The main distinction between different types of bank collateral lies in the way they affect
bankers’incentives to intermediate funds. Both assets have the potential to relax bankers’finan-
cial constraint. However, while increasing real assets exacerbates capital misallocation and re-
duces lending through a negative externality on borrowers’demand for credit, increasing bankers’
holdings of financial assets compresses the spread between the loan and the deposit rate, thus
attenuating capital misallocation. This feature of the model has key implications for equilibrium
dynamics under different degrees of collateralization of bank loans. A relatively scarce liquidity of
bankers’financial assets amplifies the response of gross output to productivity shocks. As in KM,
a positive technology shift reallocates capital from the lenders to the borrowers. On one hand, this
allows borrowers to expand their borrowing capacity. On the other hand, a decline in bankers’real
assets is typically counteracted by an expansion in bank loans: as the latter are perceived to be
increasingly illiquid, the compensation effect is gradually muted, so that bankers need to cut their
capital investment further to meet borrowers’higher demand for credit. In turn, the response of
total production– which increases in borrowers’real assets, ceteris paribus– is amplified, relative
to situations in which deposit contracts involve relatively low transaction costs in case of bankers’
default.
The model produces a countercyclical ‘flight to quality’ in bankers’optimal asset allocation
(see, e.g., Lang and Nakamura, 1995): during expansions (contractions), bankers increase (de-
crease) their holdings of the relatively illiquid asset– bank loans– while decreasing (increasing)
3In the remainder we will refer to financial assets and bank loans interchangeably, while capital goods will also
be referred to as real assets.
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their capital holdings, which do not bear any risk of default. As a result, ‘too much’borrowing
capacity is allocated during boom states and ‘too little’in bad states, inducing a procyclical bank
leverage and generating excessive fluctuations in credit, output and asset prices. From a normative
viewpoint, we study to which extent a hypothetical banking regulator may intervene to smooth the
amplitude of these fluctuations, by impairing the endogenous propagation mechanism that hinges
on capital misallocation. Along with removing or reducing systemic risks with a view to protecting
and enhancing the resilience of the financial system, the Bank of England has recently indicated
how macroprudential policy making should facilitate the supply of finance for productive invest-
ment, thus making capital allocation more effi cient (Bank of England, 2016). With respect to our
model, we show that a constant capital-to-asset ratio attenuates the transmission of technology
shifts, although the gap between borrowers’and bankers’marginal product of capital cannot en-
tirely be closed. By contrast, the regulator may successfully attenuate the economy’s response to
productivity shocks, devising a state-dependent capital buffer that induces a countercyclical bank
leverage and stabilizes fluctuations in borrowers’collateral, even without resolving the distortion
in capital allocation. This is accomplished by adjusting the capital-to-asset ratio in response to
changes in bank lending: when the rule features enough responsiveness, movements in the value of
borrowers’collateral assets are counteracted by similar-sized changes in the loan rate, so that the
traditional amplification mechanism embodied by borrowers’collateral constraint is neutralized.
Related literature This paper is strictly related to a growing literature that introduces
financial intermediation into well established quantitative macroeconomic frameworks, so as to
account for a number of distinctive features of the last financial crisis (see, inter alia, Gertler
and Kiyotaki, 2010). To name a few, Gertler and Karadi (2011), have devised a model that
emphasizes the role of collateral that banks post to their lenders, as well as their net worth,
for the transmission of unconventional monetary measures.4 Gertler et al. (2012) extend the
baseline insights of this framework, allowing intermediaries to issue outside equity– thus making
risk exposure an endogenous choice of the banking sector– while Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) devise
a model of banking that allows for liquidity mismatch and bank runs. More recently, Hirakata et
al. (2017) have introduced chained financial contracts into a dynamic general equilibrium models
à la Bernanke et al. (1999).5 The common trait of these contributions and many others in this
tradition is to look at different sources of funding of financial intermediaries– thus emphasizing
the composition of the right-hand side of banks’balance sheet– while typically considering only
one type of asset– bank loans. We deviate from this approach and focus on the role of limited
enforceability of deposit contracts in a setting where banks may invest in different assets,6 whose
4See also subsequent contributions in this modeling tradition, such as Rannenberg (2012) and Garcia-Cicco et al.
(2015), as well as earlier contributions that have stressed the role of bank capital for the transmission of a variety
of shocks, such as Aikman and Paustian (2006) and Meh and Moran (2010).
5Unlike the present framework– which is based on costly enforcement of both deposit and loan contracts–
Hirakata et al. (2017) consider costly state verification problems applying to both intermediaries and entrepreneurs.
6In this respect, our framework is closer to Chen (2001), who stresses the importance of moral hazard behavior
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distinctive trait is to bear different degrees of liquidity depending on whether they are involved in
more than one layer of financial relationships.
The paper is also part of a rapidly developing banking literature on the role of macroprudential
policy-making. Some recent examples include Martinez-Miera and Suarez (2012), Angeloni and
Faia (2013), Harris et. al (2015), Clerc et. al (2015), Begenau (2015) and Elenev et al. (2017).
These contributions rely on medium- to large-scale dynamic general equilibrium models. While
an obvious advantage of this modeling approach is to allow for a variety of shocks, transmission
channels and alternative policy settings, our framework allows for a neater interpretation of the
interplay between bank capital requirements, capital misallocation and the amplitude of credit
cycles. In this respect, our framework is more closely related to Gersbach and Rochet (2016), who
show that complete markets do not suffi ciently stabilize credit-driven fluctuations, thus providing
a clear rationale for macroprudential-policy intervention.
This paper contributes to the existing literature along two main routes. First, one obvious
advantage of our model over the existing contributions is analytical tractability, especially if we
compare our setting to the existing tradition of medium- to large-scale general equilibrium models
featuring a banking sector. In this respect, we show that i) limited enforceability of deposits and
loan contracts generate opposite effects on capital misallocation, and ii) a higher pledgeability of
bank holdings of financial assets reduces the amplification of aggregate macroeconomic shocks.
Second, a defining feature of our normative analysis is to study to which extent a regulator may
promote a more effi cient allocation of productive capital by ‘leaning against’capital misallocation.
In this respect, we emphasize that examining capital misallocation, in line with the seminal work of
KM, is paramount to understand the role of credit frictions in a model with financial intermediation
that is affected by a (double) moral hazard problem, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Chen
(2001). In particular, we show that shock amplification is a direct function of the misallocation
of capital, and that macroprudential policies are effective only in so far as they can ameliorate
distortions in the allocation of capital.
Structure The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the framework; Section 3
discusses the steady-state equilibrium; Section 4 focuses on equilibrium dynamics in the neighbor-
hood of the steady state and the amplification of shocks to productivity in connection with the
degree of financial collateralization; Section 5 examines the role of macroprudential policy-making
in reducing capital misallocation to smooth macroeconomic fluctuations; Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The economy is populated by three types of infinitely-lived, unit-sized, agents: savers, borrowers
and bankers. There are two layers of financial relationships: savers make deposits to the bankers,
of both bankers and entrepeneurs in a quantitative model à la Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). However, in this
framework there is no role for liquidity assessment of different types of bank assets.
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who act as financial intermediaries and extend credit to the borrowers. Two goods are traded in
this economy: a durable asset, ‘capital’, and a non-durable consumption good. Capital, which
is held by both bankers and borrowers, does not depreciate and is fixed in total supply to one.
All agents have linear preferences defined over non-durable consumption.7 ,8 The remainder of this
section provides further details on the characteristics of the actors populating the economy and
their decision rules.9
2.1 Savers
Savers are the most patient agents in the economy. In each period, they are endowed with an
exogenous, non-produced income. We assume that savers are neither capable of monitoring the
activity of the borrowers, nor of enforcing direct financial contracts with them. As a result, they
make deposits at the financial intermediaries. The linearity of their preferences implies that savers
are indifferent between consumption and deposits in equilibrium, so that gross interest rate on






where cSt denotes the consumption of non-durables, b
S
t is the amount of savings and ε
S is a fixed
endowment.10
2.2 Borrowers
Borrowers’ ability to attract external funding is bounded by the limited enforceability of debt
contracts. In line with Hart and Moore (1994) we assume that, should borrowers default, bankers
acquire the right to liquidate the stock of capital, kBt . Based on the predicted outcomes of the
renegotiation, borrowers are subject to an enforcement constraint. Neither bankers nor borrowers
7The model will be solved by log-linearizing it around its long-run equilibrium. In this respect, some assumptions
will be introduced to pin down the steady state, and rule out degenerate allocations of consumption and assets
across the three types of agents.
8In this respect, it is important to recall that a number of studies have shown that collateral constraints can
act as a powerful amplification and propagation mechanism of exogenous shocks under simplifying assumptions on
preferences and production technologies. Kocherlakota (2000) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) are some noteworthy
examples, in this respect. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out how modelling collateral constraints has become
the dominant approach when introducing financial frictions into otherwise standard DSGE models, and how their
combination with asymmetrc information problems affecting the banking sector typically enhances the amplification
of a variety of shocks, even under more standard assumptions on preferences and production technologies.
9Appendix B reports the derivation of the first-order conditions, and a summary of the key equilibrium conditions
of the model.
10Steady-state variables are reported without the time subscript.
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are able to observe the liquidation value before the actual default, though borrowers have all the
bargaining power in the liquidation process. With probability 1 − ω bankers expect to recover
no collateral asset after a default, while with probability ω bankers expect to be able to recover
Etqt+1k
B
t , where Et indicates the rational expectation operator and qt+1 denotes the capital price
at time t+ 1.
To derive the renegotiation outcome, we consider the following default scenarios:
1. Bankers expect to recover Etqt+1kBt . Since bankers can expropriate the whole stock of capital,
borrowers have to make a payment that leaves bankers indifferent between liquidation and
allowing borrowers to preserve the stock of collateral assets. This requires borrowers to
make a payment at least equal to Etqt+1kBt , so that the ex-post value of defaulting from the
perspective of the borrowers is:
RBbBt − Etqt+1kBt , (2)
where RB denotes the gross loan rate and bBt is the loan.
2. Bankers expect to recover no collateral. If the liquidation value is zero, liquidation is clearly
not the best option for the borrowers. Therefore, borrowers have no incentive to pay the
loan back. The ex-post default value in this case is:
RBbBt . (3)
Therefore, enforcement requires that the expected value of non defaulting is not smaller than





+ (1− ω)RBbBt , (4)
which reduces to
RBbBt ≤ ωEtqt+1kBt . (5)
According to (5), the maximum amount of credit borrowers may access is such that the sum of
principal and interest, RBbBt , equals a fraction of the value of borrowers’capital in period t+ 1.




t − kBt−1) = bBt + yBt , (6)
where cBt and y
B
t denote borrowers’consumption and production of perishable goods, respectively.
As in KM, borrowers are assumed to combine capital and labor– the latter being supplied inelas-
7




with αt being a multiplicative productivity shifter: logαt = ρ logαt−1 +ut, where ρ ∈ [0, 1) and ut
is an iid shock.
Borrowers maximize their utility under the collateral and the flow-of-funds constraints, taking
RB as given. The linearity of their preferences implies that the shadow value of borrowing amounts
to 1− βBRB. In equilibrium, the collateral constraint holds with equality in the neighborhood of
a determinate steady state:
Assumption I. βB < 1/RB
In light of this, borrowers’demand for capital is determined at the point where the present
value of the marginal product of capital, βBEtαt+1, is equal to the opportunity cost of holding












Bankers’primary activity consists of intermediating funds between savers and borrowers. However,
their ability to attract savers’financial resources is bounded by the limited enforceability of the
deposit contracts, given that bankers may divert assets for personal use (see also Gertler and Kiy-
otaki, 2015). At this stage of the analysis we abstract from the implementation of regulatory bank
capital ratios to discourage bankers’moral hazard behavior, while focusing on the characteristics
of the deposit contract.
We assume that, upon bankers’default, savers acquire the right to liquidate bankers’asset
holdings.11 At the time of contracting the amount of deposits, though, the liquidation value of
bankers’assets is uncertain. In this respect, the enforcement problem is isomorphic to that charac-
terizing bankers’lending relationship with the borrowers. However, due to the vertically integrated
structure of the credit economy, we envisage an additional friction that limits the pledgeability of
bank loans beyond that of capital. While real assets remain in the availability of the bankers for
the entire duration of the deposit contract– so that savers can frictionlessly liquidate them in case
11There are two main considerations why this assumption is a reasonable one: first, savers have no direct use of
the collateral assets; second, even if collateral assets represent an attractive investment opportunity, savers have no
experience in hedging.
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of bankers’default– the resources corresponding to bankers’financial claims are in the availability
of the borrowers. Therefore, from the perspective of the savers the possibility to liquidate bBt in
the event of a default of the banking sector goes beyond the capacity of the bankers to honor the
deposit contract, while being subordinated to borrowers’solvency. In light of this, we assume that
savers account for a transaction cost they would have to bear for seizing bank loans: (1− ξ) bBt ,
where ξ ∈ [0, 1] indexes savers’perceived liquidity of bankers’financial assets. In the extreme case,
savers regard bank loans as completely illiquid and do not accept them as collateral, ξ is set to
zero (i.e., financial frictions are no longer chained), while ξ = 1 corresponds to a situation in which
savers attach no risk to their ability of liquidating financial assets in case bankers’default.
To derive the renegotiation outcome, we assume that with probability 1 − χ savers expect
to recover no collateral, while with probability χ the expected recovery value is Etqt+1kIt + ξb
B
t ,
where kIt denotes bankers’holdings of capital and ξb
B
t represents the amount of bank loans held
as collateral, net of transaction costs. This implies the following default scenarios:
1. Savers expect to recover Etqt+1kIt + ξb
B
t . Since savers expect to expropriate the stock of
real and financial assets after bearing a transaction cost (1− ξ) bBt , bankers have to make a
payment that leaves savers indifferent between liquidation and allowing borrowers to preserve





t , so that the ex-post value of defaulting from the perspective of the bankers
is:
RSbSt − Etqt+1kIt − ξbBt . (9)
2. Savers expect to recover no collateral. If the liquidation value is zero, liquidation is clearly
not the best option for the savers. Therefore, bankers have no incentive to pay deposits back.
The ex-post default value in this case is:
RSbSt . (10)
Enforcement requires that the expected value of not defaulting is not smaller than the expected
value of defaulting, so that:
0 ≥ χ
[
RSbSt − Etqt+1kIt − ξbBt
]












according to which deposits should be limited from above by a fraction of the discounted expected
collateral value. As we shall see later, the above condition is assumed to always hold with equality.
Notably, bankers’ collateral constraint embodies the notion that real and financial assets have
different degrees of liquidity (see also Bernanke and Gertler, 1985).12 In fact, (12) recalls the
liquidity constraint envisaged by Benigno and Nisticò (2017), where safe and pseudo-safe assets
co-exist and both contribute to set the maximum amount of resources available for consumption.
In their case, while the entire stock of safe assets (i.e., money) is available to finance private
expenditure, only a fraction of pseudo-safe assets can be employed to cover consumption, as it
displays less-than-perfect liquidity.
Some considerations are in order about the role of the capital goods held by the bankers. First,
this asset mainly serves as a buffer against which the intermediary is trusted to be able to meet
its financial obligations.13 This is reminiscent of Bernanke and Gertler (1985), where the financial
sector owns bank capital to provide a source of insider equity, which is necessary to overcome
the agency problem in the model (from the perspective of the intermediary). In addition, kIt is
important in that it breaks the tight link between deposits and lending– which would be otherwise
embodied by a binding deposit contract– thus allowing for the possibility that a countercyclical
‘flight to quality’drives the supply of credit. In the present context, such an effect would translate
into bankers’allocating relatively more resources to capital investment– which, unlike bank loans,
does not bear any risk of default– during adverse periods. In turn, this mechanism may open
the route to the emergence of credit crunch episodes (Bernanke and Lown, 1991). Finally, as in
Bernanke and Gertler (1985) we assume that capital is productive, being employed by bankers to
invest in projects on their own behalf.14 Specifically, bankers’production technology is assumed










(0) > % > G
′
(1),15 where % equals the marginal product of capital for the
12As χ affects the collateralization of both real and financial assets, in the remainder we will refer to ‘financial
collateralization’ as the degree of pledgeability of bank loans that is exclusively captured by their liquidity, as
indexed by ξ.
13Broadly speaking, kIt may be seen as corresponding to bankers’ security holdings, which are typically more
liquid, as compared with bank loans.
14An alternative formalization of this setting is traced in Section 2.3.1.
15Assuming a decreasing returns to scale technology available to the borrowers would not alter our key results. As
we will see in the next section, it is the relatively higher impatience of the borrowers, combined with their collateral
constraint, that endows them with a suboptimal stock of capital. This point is also discussed in KM. Introducing
























where βI denotes bankers’discount factor and (14) is required to ensure an internal solution in
which both bankers and borrowers demand capital.16






t − kIt−1) = bSt +RBbBt−1 + yIt , (15)
where cIt denotes bankers’consumption.
Due to the linearity of their preferences, also bankers’shadow value of borrowing is constant
and equal to 1−RSβI . In the reminder of the analysis, we make the following assumption:
Assumption II. βI < 1/RS
The assumption ensures that the enforcement constraint holds with equality in the neighbor-
hood of the steady state, implying that bankers are relatively more impatient than savers.17 In
light of this, unless either χ or ξ equal zero, bankers always charge a lending rate that is lower than








from which it is possible to write down the spread between the loan and the deposit rate:
RB −RS = β
S − βI
βIβS




The first term on the right-hand side of this equality is the spread that would prevail if bankers
could not borrow off their loans (i.e., if χξ = 0), while the second term captures how bankers’
financial constraint affects their ability to intermediate funds. Increasing χ and/or ξ compresses
the spread. Greater pledgeability of financial assets increases the collateral value that savers expect
to recover in case of bankers’default. This relaxes the financial constraint, eases more deposits
and translates into a higher credit supply, thus compressing the lending rate.
The distinction between the two types of collateral has crucial implications for bankers’ in-
centives to intermediate funds between savers and borrowers. On one hand, while increasing kIt
expands bankers’ lending capacity, it also exerts a negative externality on borrowers’ demand
16The role of this property will be discussed further in Section 4.1.
17In this respect, imposing βIRS = 1 reduces the model to the conventional KM economy.
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for credit by decreasing their collateral. On the other hand, increasing bBt attenuates the debt-
enforcement problem between bankers and borrowers, as implied by the reduction of the spread
between the loan and the deposit rate. As it will be discussed in Section 4.2, such a distinction
has key implications for equilibrium dynamics.















Note that by relaxing (i) and allowing for βIRS = 1 (i.e., assuming that bankers are as impatient
as savers), (18) reduces to lenders’Euler equation in the conventional direct-credit economy à la
KM. Under these circumstances, bankers are no longer financially constrained. As we shall see in
the next section, this implies both a higher loan rate and a higher user cost of capital from the
perspective of the financial intermediaries, as compared with what observed when bankers face a
binding collateral constraint. These properties will play a crucial role for both the long-run and
the short-run behavior of the model economy.
2.3.1 On the Interpretation of Bank Capital
We have followed Bernanke and Gertler (1985) in that we assume the financial sector owns bank
capital. Specifically, bank capital mitigates the potential excessive tendency by banks to take risks
and, more generally, can serve as a cushion against solvency problems. Therefore bank capital
plays a pivotal role, as it determines the amount of funds intermediated by banks. Effectively,
this specification is a convenient way to introduce a source of insider capital. An alternative, yet
equivalent, formulation of the model can be envisaged by introducing a second productive sector,
whose firms are not affected by solvency issues. Shares (or, equivalently, corporate bonds) of firms
in this sector are bought by the intermediary sector as a way of retaining (liquid) inside capital,
which can be used to alleviate the agency problem in the model. Firms in this sector, whose





The price of each share reflects the value of the capital used in this production sector, and the
ownership of shares entails the receipt of dividends equal to the value of the production, yLt .
18
This alternative formulation is entirely isomorphic to the one we have described so far, and
highlights a possible interpretation of bank capital as the intermediary sector’s ownership of securi-
ties. Equity and money market funds shares, as well as other debt security holdings (which include
corporate bonds, mortgages and other asset-backed securities) are an important and growing share
of the financial sector’s balance sheet, and are often employed as collateral in interbank lending
18It is worth noting that, under perfect competition, the payment to bond holders would equal total revenues, yt,
in the alternative scenario where corporate bonds are purchased to provide a buffer against which the intermediary
is expected to meet its financial obligations.
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activities, particularly in the repo market.19
2.4 Market Clearing
To close the model, we need to state the market-clearing conditions. We know that the total
supply of capital equals one: kIt + k
B
t = 1. As for the consumption goods market, the aggregate
resource constraint reads as:
yt = ε
S + yIt + y
B
t , (19)
where yt denotes the total demand of consumption goods.
The aggregate demand and supply for credit are given by the two enforcement constraints














which imply that, as savers are indifferent between any path of consumption and savings, the












Thus, also the market for final goods is cleared according to the Walras’Law.
2.5 Equilibrium
Market equilibrium is defined as a sequence of prices and allocations of physical capital, debt, and
consumption of savers, borrowers and bankers {qt, kBt , kIt , bBt , bSt , cSt , cBt , cIt}, such that: each saver
chooses {bSt , cSt } to maximize her expected discounted utility subject to the budget constraint (1);
each borrower chooses {bBt , kBt , cBt } to maximize the expected discounted utility subject to the
production function (7), the borrowing constraint (5), and the flow-of-funds constraint (6); each
banker chooses {bBt , bSt , kIt , cIt} to maximize expected discounted utility subject to the technology
embodied by (13), the collateral constraint (12), and the flow-of-funds constraint (15); and the
markets for goods, capital, and debt clear. Furthermore, Assumptions I, II hold in equilibrium,
and ensure non-degenerate steady-state consumption and asset allocations across the three types
of agents.
19For instance, by the end of 2018 “other securities”are almost twice as large as the share of loans in the balance
sheet of the US (domestic) financial sector.
13
3 Steady State
Financial frictions characterizing both the savers-bankers relationship and the bankers-borrowers
relationship deeply affect the properties of the model. Examining their interaction in the long-run
is key for understanding the propagation of technology shocks.




, with µ ∈ [0, 1].























so that Equations (22), (23) and kI +kB = 1 pin down borrowers’and bankers’holdings of capital.
In turn, these allow us to characterize the key ineffi ciency at work in the economy. Importantly,
financial collateralization only affects the steady state of the economy through its impact on RB,
which in turn influences the capital price through borrowers’Euler, as implied by (22).20
[Insert Figure 1]
Figure 1 contains a sketch of the long-run equilibrium of the economy. On the horizontal
axis, borrowers’demand for capital is measured from the left, while bankers’demand from the
right. The sum of the two equals one. On the vertical axis we report the marginal product of
capital of both borrowers and bankers. Borrowers’marginal product of capital is indicated by
the line ACE∗, while bankers’marginal product is represented by the line DE0E∗. The first-best
allocation would be attained at E0, where the product of capital owned by the bankers and the
borrowers is the same, at the margin. In our economy, however, the steady-state equilibrium is
at E∗, where the marginal product of capital of the borrowers (mpkB = 1) exceeds that of the
bankers (mpkI = %). That is, relative to the first best too little capital is used by the borrowers,
due to their financial constraint. As discussed by KM, this type of capital misallocation implies a
loss of output relative to the first-best, as indicated by the area CE0E∗.21 The following remark
elaborates on the relationship between borrowers’and bankers’marginal product of capital:
Remark 1 As long as βB < βI , bankers’marginal product of capital is lower than that of the
borrowers.
20In light of this, envisaging savers that invest in real assets in place of the bankers would alter neither the role
of liquidity of bankers’financial collateral, nor the key aggregate implications of the model.
21The area under the solid line, ACE∗D, is the steady-state output.
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In fact, imposing G
′
(kI) < 1 returns the following inequality:







RS (RB − ω) . (24)
As we assume βB < βI , the left-hand side of the inequality is negative, while its right-hand side is
positive, given that βIRS < 1, RB > ξω and RB > ω hold by assumption. Therefore, a distinctive
feature of the equilibrium is that the marginal product of borrowers’capital is higher than that
of the bankers, given that the former cannot borrow as much as they want. As a result, any shift
in capital usage from the borrowers to the bankers will lead to a first-order decline in aggregate
output, as it will become evident when exploring the linearized economy.
So far, the present economy is isomorphic to that put forward by KM, as the suboptimal-
ity of the steady-state equilibrium allocation ultimately rests on borrowers’financial constraint.
However, it is important to note that combining limited enforceability of both deposit and loan
contracts induces bankers to hold less capital and increase their marginal product– thus setting
the steady-state equilibrium on a more effi cient allocation– as compared with the baseline KM
economy. To see this, it suffi ces to set βIRS = 1, so as to reduce the model to a direct-credit
economy where savers and bankers have identical degrees of impatience. Notably, in this case the
productivity gap between bankers and borrowers is higher than that obtained in the economy with
financial intermediation. This is due to the lenders charging a higher loan rate and attaining a
higher steady-state user cost of capital, which exacerbates the ineffi ciency in capital allocation.
In Figure 1 this additional loss of output, relative to the first-best allocation, is captured by the
trapezoid CKMCE∗E∗KM (where E
∗
KM indicates the steady-state equilibrium in the KM setting).
In light of this key property, the next step in the analysis consists of understanding how the
collateralization of different types of bank assets impacts on capital misallocation. To this end, we
define the productivity gap between borrowers and bankers as
mpkB −mpkI ≡ ∆ = 1− %. (25)
As far as the effect of χ on the productivity gap is concerned, this is not unambiguous: first, raising
χ inflates the steady-state capital price by compressing the intermediation spread, as embodied by
(16); second, a higher χ increases bankers’marginal benefit of relaxing the collateral constraint by
investing into an extra unit of capital: as a result, bankers have a higher incentive to accumulate
capital, so that the first factor on the right-hand side of (23) decreases in χ. As it will be detailed in
the next section, these competing forces tend to offset each other, so that bankers’deposit-to-value
ratio has little influence on capital misallocation and the propagation of technology disturbances.
As for the pledgeability of bank loans, the following summarizes the impact of financial collat-
eralization on the productivity gap:
Proposition 1 Increasing the pledgeability of bank loans (ξ) reduces the gap between bankers’and
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borrowers’marginal product of capital (∆).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Notably, a higher degree of financial collateralization expands bankers’lending capacity and
compresses the spread charged over the deposit rate. In turn, lower lending rates allow borrow-
ers to increase their borrowing capacity through a higher collateral value, ceteris paribus. The
combination of these effects is such that mpkI unambiguously increases in the degree of financial
collateralization, reducing the productivity gap with respect to the borrowers. This factor will
play a key role in determining the size of the response of gross output to a technology shock, as it
will be detailed in Section 4.1.
4 Equilibrium Dynamics
To examine equilibrium dynamics we log-linearize the key behavioral rules and constraints around
the non-stochastic steady state, where the incentive compatibility constraints (5) and (12) are
assumed to hold with equality.22 This local approximation method is accurate to the extent that
we limit the technology shock to be bounded in the neighborhood of the steady state, so that
neither borrowers’nor bankers’default occurs as an equilibrium outcome. As for borrowers’Euler
equation (8):
q̂t = φEtq̂t+1 + (1− φ)Etα̂t+1, (26)
where φ ≡ β
BRB+ω(1−βBRB)
RB
. As for the bankers’Euler equation (18):




where λ ≡ R
SβI+χ(1−βIRS)
RS
and η−1 is the elasticity of the bankers’marginal product of capital
times the ratio of borrowers’to bankers’capital holdings in the steady state (i.e., η ≡ 1−kB
kB(1−µ)).
Once we obtain the solutions for q̂t and k̂Bt as linear functions of the technology shifter, we can
determine closed-form expressions for the equilibrium path of other variables in the model. We
first focus on (26), whose forward-iteration leads to:
q̂t = γα̂t, (28)
where γ ≡ 1−φ
1−φρρ > 0. With this expression for q̂t, we can resort to (27), obtaining
k̂Bt = vα̂t, (29)
22Variables in log-deviation from their steady-state level are denoted by a "^".
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where v ≡ η
1−λ
(λ−φ)(1−ρ)ρ
1−φρ > 0. Thus, it is possible to linearize total production in the neighborhood
of the steady state, obtaining:




According to (30), the dynamics of gross output is shaped by α̂t, as well as by borrowers’capital
holdings at time t−1: the second effect captures the endogenous propagation of productivity shifts
on gross output. In fact, ŷt depends on the past history of shocks not only through the first-round
impact of α̂t, but also through the effect of α̂t−1 on k̂Bt−1, as implied by (29). In light of this, we
can rewrite (30) as
ŷt = $α̂t−1 + ut (31)
where $ ≡ ρ+ v∆yB
y
. According to (31), eliminating the key source of steady-state ineffi ciency–
i.e., attaining ∆ = 0– implies that total output’s departures from the steady state would track
the path of the technology shock, so that the model would feature no endogenous propagation of
productivity shifts.23 Moreover, we need to recall that envisaging limited enforceability of both
deposit and loan contracts reduces capital misallocation as it emerges in the original KM econ-
omy, thus compressing ∆ with respect to the case in which RSβI = 1. In this respect, the model
produces a ‘banking attenuator’that entirely rests on the functioning of financial frictions in bank-
ing activity, as compared with analogous effects stemming from the procyclicality of the external
finance premium (Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007) or monopolistic competition in the interme-
diation activity and staggered interest rate-setting schemes (Gerali et al., 2010). Figure 2 displays
the extent of the amplification effect on output in the KM model, as compared with our model,
under the baseline calibration.24 The next subsection examines the roots of this amplification
under different degrees of collateralization in the banking sector.
[Insert Figure 2]
23This property echoes the role of the steady-state ineffi ciency for short-run dynamics in the KM model. In their
setting, closing the gap between lenders’and borrowers’marginal product of capital would imply no response at all
to a productivity shift. In this respect, the key difference between the two frameworks lies in that we assume an
autoregressive shock, while they consider an unexpected one-off shift in technology.
24The discount factors are set in accordance with our assumptions about the relative degree of impatience of the
three agents in the economy and are broadly in line with existing (quarterly) calibrations involving economies with
heterogeneous agents: βS = 0.99, βI = 0.98, βB = 0.97. We set ρ = 0.95, in line with the empirical evidence
showing that technology shocks are generally small, but highly persistent (see, e.g., Cooley and Prescott, 1995). As
for χ and ω , they are both set to 1, while µ = 0.4. The response of the other variables to the technology shock is
reported in Figure D1 (Appendix D).
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4.1 Financial Collateral and Macroeconomic Amplification
We have now lined up the elements necessary to examine how savers’perceived liquidity of bankers’
financial assets affects the amplitude of credit cycles. In this respect, there are three different





















As for the first term on the right hand side of (32), Proposition 2 details the effect induced by
a marginal change in the degree of financial collateralization on the response of borrowers’capital
holdings to the technology shock.
Proposition 2 Increasing the degree of collateralization of bank loans (ξ) attenuates the impact
of the technology shock on both borrowers’holdings of capital and the capital price.
Proof. See Appendix B.
According to Proposition 2 the sensitivity of borrowers’ capital holdings to the technology
shifter decreases in ξ. The intuition for this is twofold: first, increasing ξ determines a more even
distribution of capital goods, as reflected by the drop in η; second, being able to pledge a higher
share of financial assets reinforces the sensitivity of the capital price to the capital gain component
in borrowers’Euler equation, φ, through the drop in the loan rate, while reducing the sensitivity
to the dividend component (i.e., the shock). These effects are mutually reinforcing and ultimately
exert a negative force on the overall degree of macroeconomic amplification of the system.
Turning our attention to the last two terms on the right hand side of (32), we know from
Proposition 1 that the productivity gap between borrowers and bankers shrinks as financial col-
lateralization increases (i.e., ∂∆/∂ξ < 0). Finally, it is immediate to prove that the last term on
the right-hand side of (32) is positive, in light of greater collateralization of bank loans inducing
a reallocation of capital from the bankers to the borrowers. In turn, this transfer implies both
a first-order positive effect on yB and a (milder) second-order positive impact on y, so that the
overall effect on yB/y is positive.25
[Insert Figure 3]
To sum up, an increase in ξ causes competing effects on $. First, greater financial collater-
alization depresses the pass-through of α̂t−1 on borrowers’capital holdings, which in turn affect
total production with a lag. Second, raising ξ exerts two distinct effects on the pass-through of
k̂Bt−1 on ŷt: on one hand, bankers’marginal product of capital increases, implying a reduction of
25Recall that total output is an increasing function of borrowers’capital. Therefore, the drop in yI following a
marginal increase in ξ is lower than the corresponding rise in yB .
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the productivity gap; on the other hand, borrowers’contribution to total production increases,
as the reduction in the productivity gap reflects higher capital accumulation in the hands of the
borrowers. The sum of these three forces potentially leads to mixed results on output amplifica-
tion, as captured by the second-round effect of technology disturbances. To address this, we plot
$ as a function of ξ and µ.26 The aim of this exercise is to examine the direction of the overall
effect exerted by financial collateralization on macroeconomic volatility, rather than quantifying an
empirically plausible multiplier emerging from the interaction of bankers’and borrowers’financial
constraints.27 As it emerges from Figure 3, increasing ξ compresses $, at any level of µ. By
contrast, increasing the income share of capital in bankers’production technology amplifies the
second-round response of output. This is because µ amplifies the productivity gap through its
positive effect on η.28 All in all, the general picture emerging from this exercise is that allowing
for greater financial collateralization attenuates the overall degree of amplification of technology
disturbances. The next subsection examines how this property reflects into cyclical movements
in bank leverage, whose behavior is key to understanding how bankers’balance sheet affects the
amplitude of credit cycles.
4.2 The Role of Leverage
To enlarge our perspective on the amplification/attenuation induced by bankers’financial collat-
eral, we take a closer look at their balance sheet. To this end, we define bankers’equity as the





t − bSt , (33)





Figure 4 reports the response of selected variables to a one-standard deviation shock to tech-
nology.29 As implied by (30), on impact output responds one-to-one with respect to the shock,
regardless of the degree of financial collateralization. However, as ξ increases the second-round
26In Appendix C we show that different combinations of χ and ω have negligible effects on the relationship
between financial collateralization on macroeconomic amplification. In fact, Figure C1 shows that varying χ has
virtually no effect on the amplitude of the response to the technology shock, in light of the competing effects it has
on bankers’marginal product of capital.
27We leave this task for future research employing larger scale dynamic general equilibrium models.
28It is important to emphasize that increasing µ may violate the condition G
′
(0) > % > G
′
(1), which ensures an
interior solution as for how much capital bankers should hold in the neighborhood of the steady state. To see why




= %. Increasing µ inflates bankers’marginal product of capital, while leaving
their user cost unaffected: Thus, as µ increases bankers are induced to hold an increasing stock of capital, so that
the equality holds. An important aspect is that this effect tends to kick in earlier as ξ declines. This is because a
drop in the degree of financial collateralization depresses bankers’user cost of capital. Therefore, as ξ declines and
µ increases the set of steady-state allocations in which both bankers and borrowers hold capital restricts, as the
condition % > G
′
(1) is eventually violated and borrowers’may virtually end up with negative capital holdings.
29The baseline parameterization is the same as that employed in Figure 2. As for µ, we impose a rather conser-
vative value, 0.4, which allows us to obtain a finite distribution of capital in the steady state.
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response is gradually muted. To complement our analytical insight and provide further intuition
on this channel, we examine the behavior of a set of variables involved in bankers’intermediation
activity. In this respect, note that deposits tend to decline at low values of ξ, while increasing
as bankers can pledge a higher share of their financial assets. The reason for this can be better
understood by recalling the nature of the interaction between bankers’financial and real assets.
The interplay takes place on two levels: on one hand, both assets have a positive effect on savers’
deposits, as embodied by (12); on the other hand, it is possible to uncover a crowding out effect,
as increasing bankers’real asset holdings exerts a negative force on lending by reducing borrowers’
collateral.
How do these properties affect the transmission of an expansionary technology shock? Due to
the capital productivity gap between borrowers and bankers, the technology shift necessarily causes
a decline of bankers’real assets, thus expanding borrowers’capital and borrowing.30 Therefore, in
equilibrium deposits are influenced by two opposite forces, namely an expansion in the amount of
bankers’financial assets and a contraction in their stock of real assets. In this respect, the implied
allocation of bankers’assets reflects a countercyclical flight to quality pattern (see, inter alia, Lang
and Nakamura, 1995): during expansions (contractions), bankers increase (decrease) their holdings
of the inherently riskier assets– bank loans– while decreasing (increasing) their capital holdings,
which do not bear any risk of default.
[Insert Figure 4]
How do these diverging forces translate in terms of bankers’ability to attract deposits and
leverage? As ξ drops the impact of bank loans is gradually muted and deposits eventually track
the dynamics of bankers’capital. In this context, the contraction of bankers’real asset overcomes
the drop in deposits, so that lending expands in excess of bank equity, potentially leading to an
increase in leverage. In fact, a procyclical leverage ratio is associated with a relevant degree of
macroeconomic amplification, when bankers’financial assets are regarded as relatively illiquid.
Figure 3 shows this tends to be the case for ξ < 0.5, under our baseline parameterization.
5 Capital Adequacy Requirements
The analysis so far has shown that limited enforceability of deposit contracts may reduce the
productivity gap between borrowers and lenders, which is key to quantify the amplitude of credit
cycles. In light of this, our next objective is to understand to which extent a regulator may promote
a more effi cient allocation of productive capital by ‘leaning against’capital misallocation. In this
30This is a distinctive feature of lender-borrower relationships involving the collateralization of a productive asset.
In fact, it is possible to show that, following a positive technology shock, the major reallocation of land from the
lenders to the borrowers is only attenuated by relaxing the hypothesis of zero aggregate investment– as in the KM
baseline framework– while the direction of the transfer is not inverted.
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respect, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has explicitly indicated that– conditional on enhancing
the resilience of the financial system– the Financial Policy Committee at the Bank of England
should intend the pursual of productive capital allocation effi ciency as part of its macroprudential-
policy mandate:
"Subject to achievement of its primary objective, the Financial Policy Committee
(FPC) should support the Government’s economic objectives by acting in a way that,
where possible, facilitates the supply of finance for productive investment provided by
the UK’s financial system." (Remit and Recommendations for the Financial Policy
Committee, HM Treasury, July 8, 2015).
Our economy lends itself to the analysis of this particular problem, in light of the strict con-
nection between the capital productivity gap between borrowers and bankers and the amplitude of
credit cycles.31 To this end, we introduce two complementary tools of regulation. First, we assume
deposit insurance, which ensures that savers do not suffer a loss in the event of bankers’default.32
A direct implication of such a measure is to shift the risk of bankers’default to the government (or
a hypothetical interbank deposit protection fund), so that the renegotiation of deposit contracts
is redundant and bankers’financial constraint may be discarded. However, in order to mitigate
bankers’moral hazard behavior, the regulator imposes an explicit capital adequacy requirement
(see, e.g., Van den Heuvel, 2008). According to this regulatory constraint, equity needs to be at
least a fraction θ of the loans, for bankers to be able to operate:
eIt ≥ θbBt , θ ∈ [0, 1] , (34)
where θ denotes the capital-to-asset ratio. Introducing this regulatory constraint modifies the loan
rate:
RB =






Notably, (35) is isomorphic to (16), with RB increasing in the capital-to-asset ratio. To provide
an intuition for this, we combine (34) with (33), obtaining:
bSt ≤ qtkIt + (1− θ) bBt . (36)
31Notably, our model abstracts from trade-offs that impose the policy-maker to balance the incentive to improve
the allocation of productive capital with an alternative financial stability objective, as in Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2015), inter alia. However, our primary interest is to understand how far the policy-maker can go to resolve the
key distortion in the credit economy, so that there is no need to introduce additional propagation mechanisms that
would only hinder the analytical tractability of the model.
32As in Van den Heuvel (2008), deposit insurance is left unmodeled, though it is argued that it generally improves
banks’ability to extend credit (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
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As embodied by (36), imposing a capital-to-asset ratio to bankers’intermediation activity amounts
to constrain deposits from above by the current value of bankers’collateral, with the implied degree
of pledgeability of bank loans being a negative function of θ. In fact, there is a direct mapping
between the capital-to-asset ratio implicit in the capital requirement constraint imposed by the
regulator and the degree of collateralization of bank loans as it emerges from the incentive com-
patibility constraint (12), which is derived in the absence of any form of deposit insurance.33
Intuitively, a higher leverage (lower capital) ratio implies a riskier exposure of the financial inter-
mediary. This translates into greater transaction costs savers would have to bear in order to seize
bank loans in the event of bankers’default. In turn, these costs have a direct impact on degree of
collateralization of bankers’financial assets that is implicit in (34).
[Insert Figure 5]
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that, absent any trade-off between enhancing capital
allocation and ensuring financial stability, the optimal policy consists of setting the capital-to-asset
ratio to its lower bound. Along with minimizing the fraction of bank assets that can be financed by
issuing deposit liabilities, θ = 0 contracts the intermediation spread, thus ensuring a more effi cient
allocation of capital between bankers and borrowers. Figure 5– which reports the response of the
economy to a positive technology shock under this policy– confirms this view. Nevertheless, it
is important to notice that even a null capital ratio is not enough to neutralize the endogenous
propagation channel stemming from capital misallocation, as stated by the next proposition.
Proposition 3 The gap between bankers’and borrowers’marginal product of capital (∆) cannot
be closed by setting the capital-to-asset ratio (θ) within the range of admissible values.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To dig deeper on this property, Figure 6 maps the spread between the loan and the deposit
rate (y-axis) and the productivity gap (x-axis), for different values of the capital-to-asset ratio (θ)
and the loan-to-asset ratio applying to the borrowers (ω). As we move down along each locus,
θ decreases from its upper bound to the value consistent with ∆ = 0. The color of a given line
switches from green to blue when θ drops below its lower bound. In line with Proposition 3, closing
the productivity gap through a capital requirement within the set of its admissible values proves
to be infeasible. However, it is important to acknowledge that higher loan-to-value ratios applying
to the loan contracts compress the productivity gap at any value of θ. In fact, raising ω relaxes
borrowers’collateral constraint, allowing them to increase their capital holdings, so that bankers’
marginal product of capital increases in equilibrium.
[Insert Figure 6]
33Figures D2 and D3 in Appendix D stress such isomorphism in connection with the transmission of a shock to
the degree of collateralization, under (12), and one to the capital-to-asset ratio, under (36), respectively.
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Figure 5 also shows that ∆ = 0 may only be attained at negative values of θ and RB −RS. In
Figure 5– where the capital-to-asset ratio compatible with a null productivity gap is denoted by
θ∆=0– the endogenous propagation of the shock is actually switched off under a negative capital-
to-asset ratio, so that gross output tracks the dynamics of the productivity shifter and leverage is
completely acyclical. However, according to (34), setting θ = θ∆=0 would induce bankers to hold
negative equity, for any level of credit being extended. Although we rule this out as an equilibrium
outcome, it is interesting to briefly examine the underlying incentives of the bankers in such a
scenario: according to (36), through a negative capital-to-asset ratio the regulator implicitly pushes
for ‘hyper-collateralizing’bank loans. In turn, this eventually induces bankers to set a loan rate
below the interest rate on deposits, which amounts to subsidizing borrowers’capital investment so
as to resolve the distortion.
5.1 A Countercyclical Capital Buffer
We now turn our attention to an alternative regulatory tool, in the attempt to reduce output
fluctuations by affecting the cyclicality of bankers’balance sheet, without necessarily neutralizing
the distortion stemming from capital misallocation. Recent years have witnessed an increasing
interest of policymakers towards leaning against credit imbalances, pursuing macroeconomic sta-
bilization through policy rules that set a countercyclical capital buffer. De facto, countercyclical
capital regulation is a key block of the Basel III international regulatory framework for banks.34
Based on the analysis of the transmission mechanism and the response of bank capital, we now
examine the functioning of this type of policy tool within our framework. Thus, we allow for cap-
ital requirements to vary with the macroeconomic conditions (see, e.g., Angeloni and Faia, 2013,








, ϕ ≥ 0, (37)
where ϕ = 0 implies a constant capital-to-asset ratio, while ϕ > 0 induces a countercyclical capital
buffer.35
By linearizing the time-varying counterpart of (35) in the neighborhood of the steady state we
obtain:
R̂Bt = ψθ̂t, (38)
34The regulatory framework evolved through three main waves. Basel I has introduced the basic capital adequacy
ratio as the foundation for banking risk regulation. Basel II has reinforced it and allowed banks to use internal
risk-based measure to weight the share of asset to be hold. Basel III has been brought in response to the 2007-2008
crisis, with the key innovation consisting of introducing countercyclical capital requirements, that is, imposing banks
to build resilience in good times with higher capital requirements and relax them during bad times.
35According to the Basel III regime, capital regulation can respond to a wide range of macroeconomic indicators.
Here we assume it to respond to deviations of bBt from its long-run equilibrium, b
B .
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where ψ = 1−β
IRS
βIRB




After linearizing borrowers’financial constraint, we can substitute for b̂Bt in (39) and plug the










Thus, it is possible to establish a connection between the loan rate and borrowers’expected col-
lateral value. Increasing the responsiveness of the capital-to-asset ratio to changes in aggregate
lending amplifies this channel: raising ϕ implies that marginal deviations of bBt from its steady
state transmit more promptly to the capital-to-asset ratio and, in turn, to the loan rate through the
combined effect of (38) and (39). This induces a feedback effect on borrowers’capacity to attract
external funding, as embodied by their collateral constraint: higher sensitivity of the loan rate to
variations in aggregate lending (i.e., a steeper loan supply function) implies stronger discounting
of borrowers’expected collateral. In the limit (i.e., as ϕ → ∞) there is a perfect pass-through
of Etq̂t+1 + k̂Bt on R̂
B
t . Therefore, as in the face of a technology shock both terms move in the
same direction and by the same extent, borrowing does not deviate from its steady-state level and
output displays no endogenous propagation.
[Insert Figure 7]
To assess the stabilization performance of the countercyclical capital buffer rule, in Figure 7 we
set the steady-state capital-to-asset ratio to 8%– in line with the full weight level of Basel I and
the treatment of non-rated corporate loans in Basel II and III– while varying ϕ over the support
[0, 1].36 As expected, at ϕ = 0 (i.e., a capital-to-asset ratio kept at its steady-state level) we observe
the strongest amplification of the output response, while the lending rate and bank leverage are
both acyclical. By contrast, increasing the degree of countercyclicality of the capital buffer proves
to be effective at attenuating the response of gross output to the shock, progressively compressing
bank leverage. Notably, as ϕ→∞ leverage displays a strong degree of countercyclicality,37 while
lending does not deviate from its steady-state level, as conjectured above. In turn, this results in
the response of gross output featuring no endogenous propagation of technology shocks, despite
the regulator’s policy action is not aimed at tackling capital misallocation and, therefore, the
steady-state productivity gap is not closed.
36Alternative values of θ would only alter the quantitative implications of the exercise, while not affecting its key
qualitative result.
37This is accomplished by setting ϕ = 10, meaning that, for a 1% deviation of debt from its steady-state level,
the capital-to-asset ratio is adjusted from its 8% steady-state level up to 8.8%.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We have devised a credit economy where bankers intermediate funds between savers and borrowers,
assuming that bankers’ability to collect deposits is affected by limited enforceability: as a result,
if bankers default, savers acquire the right to liquidate bankers’asset holdings. In this context,
we have examined the role of bank loans as a form of collateral in deposit contracts. Due to the
structure of our credit economy, which may well account for different forms of financial intermedi-
ation, savers anticipate that liquidating financial assets is conditional on borrowers being solvent
on their debt obligations. This friction limits the degree of collateralization of bankers’financial
assets beyond that of capital. We have demonstrated three main results: i) limited enforceabil-
ity of deposit contracts counteracts the effects of limited enforceability of loan contracts, thus
reducing capital misallocation as it emerges in KM; ii) greater collateralization of bankers’finan-
cial assets dampens macroeconomic fluctuations by reducing the degree of procyclicality of bank
leverage; iii) while imposing a fixed capital-to-asset ratio to the bankers cannot fully neutralize
capital misallocation and enhance a more effi cient allocation of productive capital– thus switching
off the associated endogenous propagation channel of productivity shock– a countercyclical capital
adequacy requirement proves to be rather effective at smoothing credit cycles.
Our model is necessarily stylized, though it can be generalized along a number of dimensions.
For instance, a realistic extension could consist of allowing bankers to issue equity (outside equity),
so as to evaluate how a different debt-equity mix may affect macroeconomic amplification over
expansions– when equity can be issued frictionlessly– and contractions, when equity issuance may
be precluded due to tighter information frictions. This factor should counteract the role of financial
assets and help obtaining a countercyclical leverage. In connection with this point, we could
also allow for occasionally binding financial constraints, so as to evaluate how the policy-maker
should behave across contractions– when constraints tighten– and expansions, when constraints
may become non-binding. However, as this type of extensions necessarily hinder the analytical
tractability of our problem, we leave them for future research projects based on large-scale models.
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Figure 1: Steady-state equilibrium
Figure 2: Output response to a technology shock: comparison with KM
Notes. Figure 2 graphs the response of ŷt to a one-standard-deviation shock to technology,
under the following parameterization: βS= 0.99, βI= 0.98, βB= 0.97, ρ = 0.95, χ = ω = 1,
µ = 0.4. We consider two situations: the KM case, where 1− βIRS= 0 (green-dashed line),
and the baseline model (blue-continuos line).
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Figure 3: Business cycle amplification
Notes. Figure 3 graphs $ as a function of ξ and µ, under the following parameteriza-
tion: βS= 0.99, βI= 0.98, βB= 0.97, ρ = 0.95, χ = ω = 1. The white area denotes inadmissible
equilibria where bankers’capital holdings are virtually negative.
Figure 4: Impulse responses to a positive technology shock
Notes. Responses of selected variables to a one-standard-deviation shock to technology,
under the following parameterization: βS= 0.99, βI= 0.98, βB= 0.97, ρ = 0.95, χ = ω = 1,
µ = 0.4.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses under θ = 0 and θ = θ∆=0
Notes. Responses of selected variables to a one-standard-deviation shock to technology,
under the following parameterization: βS= 0.99, βI= 0.98, βB= 0.97, ρ = 0.95, χ = ω = 1,
µ = 0.4.
Figure 6: Interaction between the capital-to-asset and the loan-to-value ratios
Notes. Figure 6 maps RB−RS (y-axis) and ∆ (x-axis) for different values of θ and ω. As we
move down along each line, θ decreases from its upper bound to the value consistent with
∆ = 0. The color of a given locus switches from green to blue when θ drops below zero. The
rest of the parameters are set as follows: βS= 0.99, βI= 0.98, βB= 0.97, ρ = 0.95, µ = 0.4.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses under different ϕs
Notes. Responses of selected variables to a one-standard-deviation shock to technology,
under the following parameterization: βS= 0.99, βI= 0.98, βB= 0.97, ρ = 0.95, χ = ω = 1,
µ = 0.4, θ = 0.08.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
As borrowers’marginal product of capital equals one in the steady state, we restrict our analysis
































> 0, so that
∂mpkI/∂RB < 0.










Thus, both factors on the right-hand side of (1) are negative and, since ∂∆/∂ξ = −∂mpkI/∂ξ,
increasing ξ inevitably reduces the productivity gap.
Proof of Proposition 2
We first prove that increasing ξ attenuates the impact of the technology shock on borrowers’
capital-holdings. According to Equation (35) in the main text, v quantifies the pass-through of α̂t on
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Focusing on the second term on the right-hand side of (4), we can show this is negative, as: (i)
(λρ−1)(1−ρ)ρ





< 0; (iii) ∂RB/∂ξ < 0, as implied by
(3).




































. As ∂RB/∂ξ < 0, also
the first term on the right-hand side of (4) is negative. Therefore, ν is a negative function of ξ.












= − 1− ρ
(1− φρ)2
ρ < 0, (8)
while we already know that ∂φ/∂ξ > 0. Therefore, the overall effect of ξ on γ is negative.
Proof of Proposition 3
We know that G
′
(kI) is a decreasing function of θ. Thus, we aim to prove that the gap between
bankers’and borrowers’marginal product of capital is greater than zero at θ = 0. To this end, we






















< 1 to obtain
RB >
ω
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Appendix B. Equilibrium conditions (for online publication only)
Derivation of key equilibrium conditions
Borrowers maximize their utility under the collateral and the flow-of-funds constraints, taking RB as
























where ϑBt and υt are the multipliers associated with borrowers’ budget and collateral constraint,
respectively. The first-order conditions are:
∂LBt
∂bBt
= 0⇒ −βBRBEtϑBt+1 + ϑBt − υt = 0; (10)
∂LBt
∂kBt













Condition (10) implies that a marginal decrease in borrowing today expands next period’s utility
and relaxes the current period’s borrowing constraint. As for (11), acquiring an additional unit of
capital today allows to expand future consumption not only through the conventional capital gain and
dividend channels, but also through the feedback effect of the expected collateral value on the price
of capital. As we consider linear preferences (i.e., ϑBt = ϑ
B = 1), (10) implies υt = υ = 1 − βBRB.1
Thus, the collateral constraint binds in the neighborhood of the steady state as long as RB < 1/βB,
















cIt − ϑIt [cIt +RSbSt−1 + bBt + qt(kIt − kIt−1) (13)










where ϑIt and δt are the multipliers associated with bankers’ budget constraint and enforcement
constraint, respectively. The first-order conditions are:
∂LIt
∂bSt
= 0⇒ −RSβIEtϑIt+1 + ϑIt − δt = 0; (14)
∂LIt
∂bBt
= 0⇒ RBβIEtϑIt+1 − ϑIt +
1
RS
χξδt = 0; (15)
∂LIt
∂kIt














1Steady-state variables are reported without the time subscript.
3
As we assume linear preferences, ϑIt = ϑ
I = 1. Therefore, conditions (14) and (15) imply that the
financial constraint holds with equality in the neighborhood of the steady state (i.e., δt = δ > 0) as























Summary of the model
































along with the aggregate productivity shifter: {αt}∞t=0. The general equilibrium is characterized by
the following equations:
• Market clearing (goods, credit and capital market, respectively):





































logαt = ρ logαt−1 + ut. (24)




























































Appendix C. Robustness exercises (for online publication only)
Figure C.1 Business cycle amplification.
Notes. Figure C.1 graphs $ as a function of ξ (y-axis) and µ (x-axis), and for different values of χ and
ω, under the following parameterization: βS= 0.99, βI= 0.98, βB= 0.97, ρ = 0.95. The white area denotes
inadmissible equilibria where bankers’capital-holdings are virtually negative.
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Appendix D. Additional figures (for online publication only)
Figure D1: Comparison with KM under a technology shock.
Notes. Figure D1 graphs the response to a one-standard-deviation shock to technology, under the following
parameterization: βS = 0.99, βI = 0.98, βB = 0.97, ρ = 0.95, χ = ω = 1, µ = 0.4. We consider two
situations: the KM case, where 1 − βIRS = 0 (green-dashed line), and the baseline model (blue-continuos
line).
Figure D2: Responses to a financial shock.
Notes. Figure D2 graphs the responses of selected variables to a one-standard-deviation shock to the de-
gree of collateralization, ξ, under the following parameterization: βS= 0.99, βI= 0.98, βB= 0.97, ρ = 0.95,
χ = ω = 1, µ = 0.4.
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Figure D3: Responses to a shock to the capital-to-asset ratio.
Notes. Figure D3 graphs the responses of selected variables to a (negative) one-standard-deviation shock to
capital-to-asset ratio, θ, under the following parameterization: βS= 0.99, βI= 0.98, βB= 0.97, ρ = 0.95,
ω = 1, µ = 0.4.
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